We examine the ability of the Expansionary Fiscal Contraction (EFC) hypothesis to explain the performance of of OECD economies during times of crisis. We¯nd some limited evidence in its favour: if public consumption is reduced in response to a¯scal crisis (as de¯ned by a high level of debt), private consumption does seem to increase. However the size of the e®ect is smaller than that typically found in similar studies. Furthermore, the increase in private consumption is not usually su±cient to o®set the direct e®ect of a reduction in the public consumption on output{¯scal contractions are not literally expansionary.
Introduction
The e®ect of large¯scal adjustments has become one of the most important themes in recent macroeconomic debates worldwide. In Europe, the Maastricht treaty envisages explicit targets for public debt and de¯cits. In the US, there is much discussion of the large (implicit) national debt represented by the obligations of the social security system to future retirees.
Orthodox Keynesian economics would suggest that any reduction in the budget de¯cit should lead to a decline in economic activity. However, several di®erent theories have been advanced to explain how¯scal contractions may in fact be expansionary. The¯rst, which Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) call the \German view" of¯scal policy, suggests that reductions in government spending can be expansionary due to their e®ects on private sector expectations concerning taxation. If forward-looking consumers and investors anticipate long-run tax reductions because of cuts in expenditure, then they may increase expenditure now and so o®set the demand-side e®ects of the¯scal contraction. Blanchard (1990) and Bertola and Drazen (1993) proposed an extension to the basic EFC hypothesis: if tax increases unexpectedly stabilize debt now and thus avoid a later, more painful, stabilization involving larger increases, then the change in expectations could prove expansionary. Both models imply that such an outcome is most likely to be seen when economies are \close to the edge" with high debt-GDP ratios. Perotti (1995, 1997) propose a further re¯nement of the EFC hypothesis. In a study of a wide range of¯scal adjustment experiences, theȳ nd that the adjustment programs most likely to succeed in stabilizing debt levels are those which cut expenditure as opposed to those which focus on raising taxes. They indicate that expenditure reduction programs succeed not because they reduce de¯cits by more but rather because they lead to higher growth.
The principal econometric evidence that has been put forward in support of these theories has taken the form of consumption (or savings) function analyses. Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) suggest that the Irish and Danish stabilization were associated with large positive residuals from estimated consumption and investment functions. Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) and Giavazzi et. al. (2000) perform multi-country analyses of consumption/savings to show that, if¯scal actions are large and persistent, then¯scal policy will have non-Keynesian e®ects on consumption. Perotti (1999) also argues that a consolidation is more likely to be expansionary if the public debt is high or growing rapidly.
Most the theories of EFC concentrate on explaining why consumption might increase in response to a¯scal contraction. It is important to note that this need not imply that output rises in response to the¯scal contrac-tion. So for example, following a cut in government consumption, private consumption may rise due to some EFC mechanism. But it is quite possible, indeed likely, that this consumption e®ect is not large enough to o®set the direct e®ect of the cut in government consumption so that output still falls.
In this paper we make two points. Firstly, usual panel data techniques such as¯xed e®ects may not be appropriate tools with which to examine the EFC hypothesis. Pesaran and Smith. (1995) show that the¯xed effects estimator will indeed be inconsistent when applied to dynamic panel data models in the presence of heterogeneity in slope coe±cients and serially correlated regressors. Both characteristics are likely to be present in cross country models of savings or consumption. Pesaran et. al. (1996) suggest an alternative estimator which is consistent in such circumstances. When we apply this estimator to estimate the OECD consumption function we¯nd that the size of the EFC e®ects are smaller than those found previously.
Our second point is more straight-forward. No matter how the EFC e®ect is measured the direct e®ect of a reduced de¯cit on consumption, even if positive, is typically not enough to o®set the direct e®ect of the de¯cit reduction on GDP. Thus¯scal contractions are not literally expansionary.
Fiscal Policy and Consumption
Before proceeding, we brie°y review what the various theories predict will be the e®ect of¯scal policy on consumption. 1 Broadly speaking the e®ects of net taxes (NT ) and government consumption (G) on Consumption (C ) will depend on the planning horizon of households and their expectations. In a fully speci¯ed model of in¯nitely lived agents (or dynastic households with bequests)¯scal policy will have no e®ect on national savings. Any change in the government's surplus will simply crowd out the consumption of private agents who know that increases in the surplus today facilitate decreases in the surplus at some point in the future.
2 This is the well known case of Ricardian Equivalence.
In¯nite horizon models (e.g. Over-Lapping Generation models without bequests) an increase in taxation will reduce the life time income of the current generation leading to a reduction in private savings and consumption.
In the special case of the simplest Keynesian model, changes in the government surplus will have no e®ect on private consumption once we control for disposable income.
There is a third set of models (for convenience referred to as Expecta- However it is important to note that the presence of a EFC e®ect for consumption (or savings) does not necessarily imply that a¯scal contraction will lead to an expansion of output i.e. that¯scal contractions are literally expansionary. In order for a¯scal consolidation to increase output the e®ect on consumption (savings) must not only be positive (negative), but su±ciently large so as to dominate the direct e®ect of the contraction on GDP. To be clear, let µ be the direct e®ect of government consumption (G) on private consumption (C) in (1) and let°be the direct e®ect of net taxes (N T ), once disposable income is controlled for.
In a traditional Keynesian model we would expect µ =°= 0 i.e. once we control for disposable income,¯scal policy has no e®ect on private consumption. In most empirical models where evidence of EFC is found, the estimates of µ fall in the range ¡1 < µ < 0 generating the well known perverse e®ect of G on C: However in order to have a¯scal contraction that actually leads to an expansion in output we must have µ < ¡1. 3 It is worth noting that none of the non-Keynesian e®ects of G on C identi¯ed by Giavazzi et. al. (2000) are large enough to generate a negative output multiplier. In fact the term \Expansionary Fiscal Contraction" seems to have come to refer to the e®ect on consumption rather than the net e®ect on output.
Econometric Evidence
In this sections we estimate consumption functions for 18 OECD countries using data from OECD Economic Outlook CD ROM. Our speci¯cation nests the three sets of models discussed above and is similar to that employed elsewhere in the literature. 4 Table 1 We estimate a dynamic version of (1) with interactions added to capture the possibility of non-linear e®ects. This speci¯cation nests the traditional Keynesian view that consumption is purely a function of disposable income.
We follow the recent literature and allow for possibly nonlinear e®ects of scal policy by interacting the¯scal variables with various other variables that capture the potential for non-linear e®ects during times of crisis.
The usual approach to estimation in this context is to pool the data 4 See Giavazzi and Pagano (1996), Giavazzi et. al. (2000) and Perrotti (1999) for examples. 5 We had to drop the United Kingdom due to the absence of data on the government surplus before 1987. This is curious as such data appears to have been available in previous versions of Economic Outlook such as that used by Giavazzi et. al. (2000) . 6 Potential GDP is de¯ned as GDP passed through a Holdrick-Prescott Filter. Giavazzi et. al. (2000) used the OECD's potential ouput series, which is virtually indistinguishable from ours but available for a shorter period.
across countries and apply a¯xed e®ects estimator. However this approach may be inappropriate because of institutional di®erences across countries not captured by¯xed e®ects. There is no reason to expect that the e®ect of¯scal policy on savings should be the same or even similar in di®erent countries. Pesaran and Smith (1995) formalize this intuition to show that the¯xed e®ects estimator will be inconsistent in dynamic panels with serially correlated regressors and heterogeneous slope coe±cients. The problem arises because, when the regressors are serially correlated, incorrectly imposing homogenous slope coe±cients induces serial correlation in the residuals which in turn leads to inconsistent estimates of dynamic models for the usual reason.
This inconsistency would disappear if one of the following held: i) there was no lagged dependent variable (so that serial correlation in residuals matters only for e±ciency not for consistency); ii) there was no serial correlation in the regressors; iii) the slope coe±cients are the same for all countries. It seems unlikely that either of the¯rst two conditions hold in the present application.
The third condition is more plausible and is implicitly assumed by most of the rest of the literature. However, we believe that it is probably unreasonable to assume that the dynamic adjustment of consumption or savings is the same across countries. Therefore we use the Mean Group estimator, the estimator proposed by Pesaran and Smith (1995) and shown by them to be consistent but less e±cient than the¯xed e®ects estimator.
7 Table 2 shows the results. 8 The¯rst column reports the results of thē xed e®ect estimation of the basic regression without any interaction e®ects.
The second column reports the mean group estimates of the same regression.
9
A quick glance at the coe±cients suggests that the two procedures seem to produce statistically di®erent estimates. Most obviously the autoregressive component of consumption is much lower in the MG case. This will imply that the dynamic e®ects of¯scal policy will be very di®erent than suggested by the¯xed e®ects estimator. A formal Hausman type test of the null that both estimates are the same leads to rejection at all usual signi¯cance levels. 10 Thus we conclude that the¯xed e®ects estimator is inconsistent.
Concentrating on the consistent mean group estimator in column two, we notice that the estimated e®ects of¯scal policy appear to be non-Keynesian.
We look¯rst at the e®ect of changes in net taxes. The impact e®ect of 7 Peseran et. al. (1996) provide formulae for the asymptotic distribution of the mean group estimator and conduct monte carlo simlulations of it against the more usual¯xed e®ects estimator.
8 Q-tests indicate that Consumption is an AR(2) and all other series can be modeled as AR(1) so two lags of consumption and a single lag of other variables should be su±cient to capture the dynamics of the system 9 We also estimated the savings function instrumenting using lagged values of the variables and a measure of the cyclically adjusted¯scal surplus calculated by the OECD. The resulting point estimates were similar to those presented in table 2. Furthermore as in Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) the estimates are not very robust to alternative sets of instruments. Therefore we do not report the results of the IV estimation.
10 Peseran et al. (1996) show that if This is what we would expect from a forward looking model and lends credence to the EFC hypothesis. When debt is high, a further increase in government consumption aggravates the¯scal crisis, inducing private agents to increase their precautionary savings and decrease their consumption.
The estimates indicate that the e®ect of government consumption on private consumption is negative for debt-potential GDP ratios in excess of 0:6. Note also that with a debt-potential GDP ratio in excess of 0:81 the impact e®ect of government consumption on private consumption would be su±ciently negative to lead to a decline in output i.e.¯scal contractions would be literally expansionary (3 ¡ 0:81 ¤ 4:94 = ¡1). This condition is rare, however, occurring in only 12 percent of the sample and only for¯ve countries (Ireland, Italy, Belgium, Japan, Canada, Greece).
13 The ratio of debt to potential GDP in Ireland was 25 percent in 1979 and 85 per cent in 1987. The later date can be regarded as the start of the EFC episode identi¯ed by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) .
We examined the Expansionary Fiscal Contraction Hypothesis using a panel of OECD data. We¯nd that the estimated e®ect of¯scal variables is sensitive to the estimation method used. It appears that the¯xed e®ects estimator that has become standard in this literature is inconsistent. We use the consistent \Mean Group" estimator as recommended by Pesaran at. al. (1996) .
We¯nd some evidence in favour of EFC occurring during times of¯nan-cial crisis as indicated by high debt levels. Thus our results support the re¯nement of the EFC hypothesis¯rst put forward by Blanchard (1990) and re-examined by Giavazzi et. al. (2000) . In contrast to some other recent studies, we¯nd little evidence to support the more general hypothesis that EFC occur as a result of abnormally large changes in¯scal policy. In short, what appears to matter is the level of the countries debt not the size of the adjustment. Finally we note that the size of the EFC e®ect is relatively small, and only in the most extreme cases will it be large enough to overcome the direct contractionary e®ects a¯scal retrenchment and lead to an increase in activity i.e.¯scal contraction may have non-Keynesian e®ects but will not, literally, be expansionary. 
